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Cohabitants, Detriment and the Potential of Proprietary Estoppel: 
Southwell v Blackburn [2014] EWCA Civ 1347  
 
Andy Hayward* 
 
This commentary critiques the Court of Appeal decision of Southwell v Blackburn 
that involved a successful proprietary estoppel claim by a former cohabitant. It will 
argue that although the decision appears in some respects inconsistent with previous 
authority, it does suggest that proprietary estoppel could have a greater role to play 
in cohabitation disputes. Nevertheless Southwell is by no means a landmark ruling 
and nor is proprietary estoppel the panacea for cohabitants as it suffers many of the 
limitations levelled against the more commonly used common intention constructive 
trust. If the courts were to prioritise or develop proprietary estoppel further in this 
context, it would need to modify the traditional requirements of estoppel namely a 
representation, inducing detrimental reliance. With that process in mind, this 
commentary questions whether proprietary estoppel should be remodelled in the 
domestic consumer context to enable the doctrine to have greater application by 
cohabitants upon relationship breakdown. 
 
(A) Introduction  
 
In the context of ownership disputes over the family home, the courts and academic 
community in England and Wales have long flirted with the prospect of developing 
proprietary estoppel. From as early as the 1980s, this flirtation has, at times, been 
overt with academics supporting the greater use of estoppel as an effective alternative 
to securing beneficial ownership through implied trusts.
1
 More recently, these explicit 
calls
2
 for a greater role for estoppel appear to be a direct consequence of the absence 
of statutory rights and remedies for cohabitants
3
 coupled with the realisation that the 
only viable alternative to estoppel is the ‘antiquated and unwieldy law of trusts’.4  
 
This flirtation has also been somewhat less intentional in light of estoppel’s confused 
relationship with the common intention constructive trust. In several cases,
5
 the courts 
identified commonality between the two devices and questioned whether it really 
mattered where ‘the true analysis lies’.6 Estoppel was said to have at its core the 
                                                        
* Lecturer in Family Law, Property Law and Equity, Durham Law School. The author would like to 
thank Brian Sloan, Rhys Taylor, Aoife O’Donoghue, Chris Bevan, Stephen Gilmore and the 
anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier draft. All errors and opinions remain my own. 
1
 For an early call for the increased use of proprietary estoppel by cohabitants see, J Warburton, 
‘Interested or Not?’ [1986] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 291 at p 295, D Hayton, ‘Equitable 
Rights of Cohabitees’ [1990] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 370 and D Burles, ‘“Promises, 
Promises” – Burns v Burns 20 Years On’ [2003] 33 Family Law 797. For a more sceptical view of the 
development of proprietary estoppel for use by cohabitants, see M Cardinal, ‘Inheritance or Estoppel – 
How the Cohabitant Succeeded’ [2004] 34 Family Law 362.   
2
 See S Gardner, ‘Material Relief between Ex-Cohabitants 2: Otherwise than by Beneficial 
Entitlement’ [2014] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 201. 
3
 Despite admirable reform proposals, see Law Commission, Cohabitation: The Financial 
Consequences of Relationship Breakdown (Law Com No 307, 2007). 
4
 The Cohabitation Rights Bill, Hansard, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames 12
th
 December 2014 
Column 2069. 
5
 See Lloyds Bank Plc v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107 at p 132 (Lord Bridge), Yaxley v Gotts [2000] Ch 162 
at p 176 (Robert Walker LJ) and Cox v Jones [2004] EWHC 1486 at para [80] (Mann J). 
6
 Oxley v Hiscock [2005] EWCA Civ 546 [71] (Chadwick LJ).  
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‘same general principle as that invoked in Gissing v Gissing’ namely preventing the 
insistence of strict legal entitlement in circumstances where it would be inequitable to 
do so.
7
 Indeed, Hayton went so far as saying Gissing ‘reinvented proprietary estoppel 
in the guise of a common intention constructive trust’.8 This insouciance generated 
theoretical debate
9
 but for decades stymied the practical development of proprietary 
estoppel as a distinct and analytically separate claim for cohabitants.
10
 
 
With modern authorities now starting to differentiate estoppel from the common 
intention constructive trust,
11
 an independent examination of estoppel is needed. For 
present purposes, the key questions become whether estoppel can, and should, be 
further developed so as to play a greater role in cohabitation disputes. Should estoppel 
be argued in the alternative to the constructive trust or should it have a more central 
role in litigation concerning ownership of the family home? With a view to answering 
these questions, the Court of Appeal decision in Southwell v Blackburn provides some 
insights and hints at future possibilities.
12
 Lauded by Resolution as a ‘landmark’ 
decision
13
 and generating extensive media coverage,
14
 Southwell v Blackburn saw a 
cohabitant succeed on the basis of estoppel to secure a lump sum award from her 
former partner. At face value, this decision goes against the trend of earlier authorities 
where several former cohabitants were denied an estoppel remedy following 
relationship breakdown.
15
 However, this commentary questions the methodology used 
by the Court of Appeal and whether the result in the case was in fact consistent with 
previous authority. The significance of this decision will be assessed but, more 
importantly, this commentary will use the judgment as a primer for analysing the 
future role of estoppel in disputes between cohabitants.  
 
(A) Facts and County Court Decision 
 
                                                        
7
 Christian v Christian (1981) 131 NLJ 43 (Brightman LJ) referring to the House of Lords decision in 
Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886. The same sentiment was expressed in Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 
638 at p 656 (Browne-Wilkinson VC). 
8
 D Hayton, ‘Constructive Trusts of Homes – A Bold Approach’ (1993) Law Quarterly Review 485, 
486. 
9
 See, for example, P Ferguson, ‘Constructive Trusts – A Note of Caution’ (1993) Law Quarterly 
Review 114 arguing in favour of separating the two devices and D Hayton, ‘Equitable Rights of 
Cohabitees’ [1990] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 370. On the unhelpful cross-fertilization of 
ideas between the two devices, see J Martin, ‘Estoppel and the Ubiquitous Constructive Trust’ [1987] 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 211 at p 213 and B Sufrin, ‘Intention and Detriment’ (1987) 50 
Modern Law Review 94 at p 100. 
10
 See Mee’s observation that the overlap with common intention analysis has meant that proprietary 
estoppel has had a ‘lower profile in the family cases than would otherwise have been expected’ in J 
Mee, The Property Rights of Cohabitees (Hart 1999) 93. 
11
 See, for example, Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at para [37] where Lord Walker questioned 
whether proprietary estoppel and the constructive trust ‘can or should be completely assimilated’.   
12
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1347. For an earlier questioning of this assimilation, see Hyett v Stanley & Others 
[2003] EWCA Civ 942 at para [27] (Sir Martin Nourse). 
13
 Resolution, Groundswell of Support Building for Cohabitation Reform 
http://www.resolution.org.uk/news-list.asp?page_id=228&n_id=247.  
14
 See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2795843/man-ordered-pay-28-500-ex-girlfriend-break-
landmark-court-ruling-unmarried-couples.html (Daily Mail), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
hereford-worcester-29650048 (BBC News) http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/ex-girlfriend-keep-
love-split-payout-4457423 (Daily Mirror). 
15
 See, for example, Layton v Martin [1986] 1 FLR 171, Coombes v Smith [1986] 1 WLR 808, 
Lissimore v Downing [2003] 2 FLR 208, James v Thomas [2007] EWCA Civ 1212, Morris v Morris 
[2008] EWCA Civ 257. 
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The parties, David Southwell and Catherine Blackburn met in 2000. Miss Blackburn 
was recently divorced with two teenage children from a previous marriage. Miss 
Blackburn had limited resources and spent the money she acquired from the divorce 
renovating and furnishing a rented property in Manchester. Mr Southwell lived in 
Portsmouth and was unmarried with no intention of marrying in the future. In 2002 
the parties decided to set up home in a location halfway between where they both 
were currently residing. The property was purchased in Mr Southwell’s sole name and 
was financed through a mortgage of £100,000 coupled with the proceeds of sale from 
his previous property. Miss Blackburn made no direct financial contributions to the 
initial acquisition of the property. After seven years of cohabiting, the relationship 
broke down and Mr Southwell changed the locks on the property. 
 
Miss Blackburn claimed that it was the practicalities of signing documents that caused 
the legal title to be vested in Mr Southwell. For Miss Blackburn, the property was 
intended to be a joint home and shared equally. Furthermore, Mr Southwell made 
numerous assurances to the effect that Miss Blackburn would always have a home 
which induced her to leave her previous property. Mr Southwell strongly disputed this 
evidence and stated that it was intended to be his sole acquisition and that he made no 
promises to her regarding securing a proprietary interest or granting her occupation of 
the property.   
 
Miss Blackburn applied to Worcester County Court and before His Honour Judge 
Pearce Higgins QC secured a lump sum payment of £28,500 on the basis of 
proprietary estoppel. In reaching that outcome, HHJ Pearce Higgins QC made several 
findings of fact. It was clear that the decision to purchase the property was a joint one 
as it was convenient for both concerned and, if the evidence of Mr Southwell was to 
be believed, it would have been ‘almost an accident that they both took up residence 
together’.16 Yet it was apparent that Mr Southwell was ‘shrewd’ and guarded’ and 
thus the acquisition had to be ‘on his terms’.17 However, whilst neither party was 
‘blind to the realities’ of their relationship potentially ending,18 Mr Southwell did in 
fact make assurances to Miss Blackburn that ‘she would always have a home and be 
secure in [the property concerned]’.19 For HHJ Pearce Higgins QC these assurances 
evinced a long-term commitment to support Miss Blackburn that, as a direct 
consequence, encouraged her to ‘give up independence and security’. 20  Mr 
Southwell’s personal commitment to her was further supported by evidence that Miss 
Blackburn was to receive a lump sum payment and pension entitlement following his 
death. As a result, the constituent elements of proprietary estoppel were made out; 
namely an assurance inducing detrimental reliance on the part of the claimant.  
 
When satisfying the equity, HHJ Pearce Higgins QC sought to place Miss Blackburn 
in the same position as she was before leaving her Manchester home. The combined 
expenditure on the Manchester property and setting up the new property with Mr 
Southwell was £20,000 which, when updated in light of inflation and approximated, 
resulted in an award of £28,500. Mr Southwell appealed on three grounds; namely, 
that the alleged assurances were too imprecise, that any detriment to Miss Blackburn 
                                                        
16
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1347 at para [4] citing the County Court judgment, at para [11] (unreported). 
17
 Ibid at para [4] citing the County Court judgment, at para [12] (unreported). 
18
 Ibid at para [4] citing the County Court judgment, at para [15] (unreported). 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
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had been dissipated over the course of their relationship and that Mr Southwell’s 
conduct was not unconscionable.  
  
(A) Court of Appeal Decision 
 
Tomlinson LJ gave the main judgment with McFarlane and Macur LJJ agreeing. On 
the first ground of appeal, namely the specificity of the representation, Tomlinson LJ 
referred to Lord Scott’s opinion in Thorner v Major and stated that the representation 
must be ‘clear and unequivocal’.21 Although counsel for Mr Southwell asserted that 
the right claimed was unclear as it could be construed as a life interest, a home 
dependent on the duration of the relationship or even a pledge of financial support, 
Tomlinson LJ was satisfied that the right identified sufficiently related to land. Citing 
observations in Taylors Fashions Limited v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd that 
cautioned against placing the elements of estoppel into some ‘preconceived 
formula’,22 Tomlinson LJ found that, in effect, Mr Southwell had made a promise of a 
secure home for life and this promise was inconsistent with claim made by his 
counsel that Miss Blackburn was to have accommodation only for as long as the 
relationship lasted. Arguments made by counsel that a home for life would be 
inconceivable in light of Mr Southwell’s refusal to marry Miss Blackburn or share 
beneficial ownership were also rejected. Tomlinson LJ noted that: 
 
‘Just because the Appellant avoided any assurance as to equal ownership it 
does not follow that he could not have given an assurance as to security of 
rights of occupation in the house that they were in effect buying together.’23 
 
On the second point of appeal concerning the detriment suffered by Miss Blackburn, 
Tomlinson LJ cited Robert Walker LJ’s observations in Gillett v Holt stating that, 
whilst detriment was needed, it was ‘not a narrow or technical concept’.24 Detriment 
also was to be analysed as ‘part of a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an 
assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances’.25 For Tomlinson LJ, 
the key point in time was when the promise fell to be performed and, after that point 
had passed, the detriment needed to be ‘assessed and evaluated over the course of the 
relationship’.26 Furthermore, the court accepted that detriment need not be financial in 
nature and thus its assessment was not an ‘exercise in financial accounting’.27 
 
When analysing the course of the relationship, Tomlinson LJ found that benefits 
flowed both ways. Miss Blackburn received rent-free accommodation for herself and 
her daughters coupled with financial assistance in helping her complete a three-year 
degree course. Mr Southwell enjoyed an increase in earnings and pension entitlement 
alongside an increase in the value in the home, in part, through Miss Blackburn’s 
                                                        
21
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1347 at para [6] citing Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 at para [15] (Lord 
Scott). 
22
 Ibid at para [7] citing Taylors Fashions Limited v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] 1 QB 
133 at pp 151-152 (Oliver J). 
23
 Ibid at para [10]. 
24
 Ibid at para [12] citing Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 201 at p 232 (Robert Walker LJ). 
25
 Ibid at para [12]. 
26
 Ibid at para [13]. 
27
 Ibid at para [17] echoing statements in Davis v Davis [2014] EWCA Civ 568 at paras [50]-[51] 
(Floyd LJ). 
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‘major housekeeping activities’.28 Tomlinson LJ conceded that there may be cases, 
such as Sledmore v Dalby,
29
 where the flow of benefit and detriment may cancel each 
other out.
30
 However, this was no such case, particularly as cases where parties were 
living as husband and wife do not lend themselves readily to that sort of ‘arithmetical 
accounting exercise’.31 In this instance: 
 
‘The various asserted benefits, flowing in both directions, were the incidents 
of the relationship whilst it successfully subsisted rather than direct 
consequences of reliance upon the promise as to security.’32 
 
Therefore Tomlinson LJ affirmed the approach of HHJ Pearce Higgins QC that 
accepted that the flow of benefit and detriment was useful context, but nevertheless it 
was the causal link between the promise of a secure home made by Mr Southwell and 
the detriment of Miss Blackburn giving up a home that was key. 
 
As to the final appeal point, namely that the conduct of Mr Southwell had not been 
unconscionable, Tomlinson LJ dismissed this swiftly. Counsel for Mr Southwell 
asserted that as he had catered for virtually all of Miss Blackburn’s financial needs 
and those of her children, it was not unconscionable for him to require her to leave the 
property. Tomlinson LJ found that unconscionability was ‘not a watertight element in 
the estoppel but rather a feature which permeates all of its elements’.33 By focusing on 
the provision of support by Mr Southwell and whether that provision negated a 
finding of unconscionability, there was a failure to recognise a promise on the 
strength of which Miss Blackburn gave up her home. In essence, Mr Southwell’s 
argument focused on incidents of the relationship and not the promise resulting in 
detrimental reliance. There was no need for Miss Blackburn to add further evidence 
of unconscionability, such as her being excluded from the home, once detrimental 
reliance upon an assurance had been made out. After dismissing the appeal, 
Tomlinson LJ affirmed the original award made by HHJ Pearce Higgins QC.   
 
(A) Analysis 
 
Southwell v Blackburn is a significant decision on the use of estoppel by cohabitants. 
After rejecting the application of a common intention constructive trust, a more 
routinely applicable device in this context,
34
 Southwell is a notable example of the 
Court of Appeal recognising that proprietary estoppel has clear application in these 
types of disputes. This is telling as when both constructive trust and proprietary 
estoppel are argued, often the rejection of the former results in the dismissal of the 
latter.
35
 Miss Blackburn’s success also suggests that rather than pleading estoppel in 
the alternative to a common constructive trust, as was common in cases following 
Stack v Dowden,
36
 estoppel has the potential to be developed as the preferred claim 
for disappointed former cohabitants. Indeed, as will be explored further below, there 
                                                        
28
 Ibid at para [15]. 
29
 [1996] 72 P&CR 196. 
30
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1347 at para [17]. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid at para [18]. 
33
 Ibid at para [20]. 
34
 See, for example, Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 at para [51] (Lady Hale and Lord Walker).  
35
 See James v Thomas [2007] EWCA Civ 1212, Morris v Morris [2008] EWCA Civ 257. 
36
 [2007] UKHL 17. 
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may now be cogent reasons for counsel to rely solely on estoppel because evidence 
justifying that particular claim may actually undermine an argument based on sharing 
of beneficial ownership under a common intention constructive trust.  
 
Coupled with the prioritisation of estoppel, Southwell also demonstrates judicial 
appreciation of the domestic consumer context. It hints at the prospect of the courts 
developing estoppel further to acknowledge the interactions, interdependency and 
potential vulnerability found in cohabitating relationships.
37
Whilst some have 
criticised developing equitable doctrines to fit a particular context,
38
 this process has 
to an extent already occurred in the context of common intention constructive trust.
39
 
In relation to proprietary estoppel, it was also predicted as a likely result of the House 
of Lords decision in Thorner v Major.
40
 That decision intimated that, in contrast to 
cases originating in a commercial context,
41
 estoppel may be more likely to succeed 
in the domestic context in light of the doctrine’s greater tolerance of informality.42 
Whilst the development or as some have called it ‘familialisation’ of equitable 
doctrines and principles can be viewed as both beneficial and modernising,
43
 
Southwell exposes some of the difficulties of modifying estoppel for specific use by 
cohabitants.  
 
Before analysing key aspects of Southwell, it should be noted that, at a general level, 
the Court of Appeal judgment is certainly no master class in judicial reasoning. 
Although an appeal on the facts and not specifically on the law, the laconic and short 
judgment struggles to reconcile some of the first instance findings with accepted legal 
principle and the reasoning often hides behind statements as to the breadth and 
flexibility of proprietary estoppel. Similarly, by failing to clarify and correct specific 
points of law, the Court of Appeal appears implicitly to endorse a less than 
satisfactory first instance decision. For example, although Tomlinson LJ noted that 
the facts were very much in dispute, in his view the first instance judge had made 
‘clear findings’.44 However, when the Court of Appeal reproduces these findings they 
do appear somewhat contradictory. One cannot help wondering whether Tomlinson 
LJ’s support of observations made in Thorner that an appellate court should be slow 
to interfere with findings of a first instance judge perhaps explains why the court 
                                                        
37
 Lending support to Gardner’s call to modify the transactional requirements of estoppel, see S 
Gardner, ‘Material Relief between Ex-Cohabitants 2: Otherwise than by Beneficial Entitlement’ [2014] 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 201.  
38
 See, for example, N Hopkins, ‘The Relevance of Context in Property Law: A Case for Judicial 
Restraint?’ (2011) 31(2) Legal Studies 175. See also A Hayward, ‘The ‘Context’ of Home: 
Cohabitation and Ownership Disputes in England and Wales’ in M Diamond & T Turnipseed, 
Community, Home and Identity (Ashgate 2012) 179. 
39
 See J Dewar, ‘Land, Law, and the Family Home’ in S Bright and J Dewar, Land Law: Themes and 
Perspectives (OUP 1998) and J Dewar, ‘Give and Take in the Family Home’ [1993] Family Law 231. 
See also Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 where Baroness Hale advocated a context specific approach 
to be adopted in the domestic consumer context. 
40
 [2009] UKHL 18 as noted in N Piska, ‘Hopes, Expectations and Revocable Promises in Proprietary 
Estoppel’ (2009) 72(6) Modern Law Review 984 at p 1015.   
41
 See Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55. 
42
 See Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, ‘The Stuffing of Minerva’s Owl? Taxonomy and Taxidermy’ 
(2009) 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal 537. 
43
 See A Hayward, ‘Family Property and the Process of Familialization of Property Law’ [2012] 23(3) 
Child and Family Law Quarterly 284 and A Hayward, ‘Finding a Home for “Family Property”’ in N 
Gravells, Landmark Cases in Land Law (Hart 2013). 
44
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1347 at para [3]. 
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sought to gloss over these inconsistencies.
45
 Of course, there must be a degree of 
deference to the judge who saw and heard the witnesses giving evidence; however, 
that respect alone cannot be used as a justification for dispensing with the functions of 
an appellate court. Whilst it will be argued that Southwell is a useful example of a 
post-Thorner case demonstrating a use of estoppel cognisant of the cohabitation 
context, there are two key areas where the decision and its future impact on the law 
requires closer inspection. 
 
(A) The Nature and Specificity of Representations 
 
It is trite law that for an estoppel to arise there needs to be a representation or 
assurance.
46
 In Thorner, Lord Walker noted the absence of a comprehensive 
definition of proprietary estoppel but identified the fact of a representation or 
assurance as a key element of the doctrine.
47
 This observation naturally is consistent 
with earlier authorities stating that an assurance was required.
48
 However, there is 
inconsistency in the case law as to the degree of specificity required for this 
representation or, phrased differently, the uncertainty tolerated for such 
representations to generate liability. As a result, there is a tension found in this 
requirement that has particular resonance in the cohabitation context. If the specificity 
bar is set too high, the courts could restrict claims and thereby allow the insistence of 
strict rights by the legal owner in circumstances that would be deemed inequitable.
49
 
If set too low, poorly defined representations could generate an equity but, by being 
vague, an equity that would suffer from even worse unpredictability when the court 
comes to craft the appropriate remedy.  
 
In Southwell, Tomlinson LJ recognised the requirement of a representation but 
proceeded on the basis that the representation must be ‘clear and unequivocal’, which 
he attributed to Lord Scott’s opinion in Thorner.50 Obviously, the selection of this 
particular viewpoint could be linked to Mr Southwell’s counsel arguing in favour of a 
higher test for the representation. However, the selection of this test, adopted by the 
Court of Appeal in Thorner and deriving originally from promissory estoppel, is 
curious. It is well known that the opinion of Lord Scott, who fully supported this test 
in the House of Lords, is widely viewed as somewhat out of line with the other 
Lordships in Thorner.
51
 In relation to this specific requirement, both Lord Walker and 
Lord Rodger were critical of the need for the representation to be ‘clear and 
                                                        
45
 Ibid at para [19].  
46
 See, generally, B McFarlane, The Law of Proprietary Estoppel (Oxford University Press 2014) para 
2.01.  
47
 [2009] UKHL 18 at para [29]. 
48
 See Matharu v Matharu (1994) 68 P & CR 93. 
49
 See R Walker, ‘Which Side “Ought to Win”: Discretion and Certainty in Property Law’ (2008) 6 
Trust Quarterly Review 5. Also note that a degree of ambiguity should be tolerated to distinguish 
estoppel from a contractual claim.  
50
 Lord Neuberger, at para [84] in Thorner, also did not seek to cast doubt on the need for a ‘clear and 
unequivocal’ representation. 
51
 For example, Lord Scott stated in Cobbe, at para [14], that proprietary estoppel was a subspecies of 
promissory estoppel; a view which Lord Walker cast doubt upon in Thorner at para [67]. Similarly, 
Lord Scott also sought to controversially analyse testamentary promise cases through a remedial 
constructive trust. On the difficulties of Lord Scott’s analysis in both Cobbe and Thorner see M Dixon, 
‘Proprietary Estoppel: A Return to Principle’ [2009] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 260 at pp 266-
268 and B Sloan, ‘Proprietary Estoppel: Recent Developments in England and Wales’ (2010) 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 110 at pp 116-119.  
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unequivocal’. Indeed, they preferred to say that, in light of the context of the dispute, 
the representation needed to be ‘clear enough’.52 Lord Hoffmann did not directly 
comment on this test but said that it sufficed that the representations were intended to 
be ‘taken seriously’.53 These viewpoints also map onto those found in previous cases 
that have supported a lower benchmark.
54
 Therefore, by Tomlinson LJ accepting a 
more stringent test for a representation in Southwell, this makes the analysis and 
acceptance of the wide-ranging and somewhat equivocal representations made by Mr 
Southwell rather problematic. This apparent inconsistency between the legal test and 
its actual application was particularly noticeable in Thorner, where the respondent 
had an aversion to speaking in direct terms yet both Lord Scott and Lord Neuberger 
were able to satisfy themselves that clear and unequivocal representations had in fact 
been made.
55
 
 
A closer inspection of the representations in Southwell shows that although the Court 
of Appeal largely accepted the findings of fact of the first instance judge, the 
representations made to Miss Blackburn were varied. In the County Court, HHJ 
Pearce Higgins QC believed both parties to be ‘untruthful’ as to the events leading up 
to the acquisition of the property.
56
 Nevertheless, Mr Southwell was deemed to have 
made several assurances, namely that Miss Blackburn ‘would always have a home 
and be secure in this one’57  and that Mr Southwell was ‘taking on a long term 
commitment to provide her [Miss Blackburn] with a secure home’.58 HHJ Pearce 
Higgins QC provided a more detailed explanation of Mr Southwell’s assurances when 
he said: 
 
‘The discussions they had were not specific as to ownership of the home they 
were moving into.  They were specific as to the nature and extent of his 
commitment to her and the provision of secure accommodation for her.  He 
promised her secure rights of occupation at the house that they were in effect 
buying together, although in his sole name.  He led her to believe that she 
would have the sort of security that a wife would have, in terms of 
accommodation at the house, and income.’59 
 
Counsel for Mr Southwell argued that there was no attempt made by him to clarify 
what provision of a secure home meant
60
 and that, as a result of this ambiguity, 
several questions could be asked as to the nature of the entitlement. For example, was 
Mr Southwell offering a home for life or a home for as long as the relationship 
endured? Similarly, what would happen if Miss Blackburn formed a new 
relationship? What precisely was meant by the sort of security a wife would have? 
Arguably HHJ Pearce Higgins QC failed to address these different types of 
representations and conflated representations as to Mr Southwell’s commitment and 
                                                        
52
 Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 at paras [26] and [56].  
53
 [2009] UKHL 18 para [5]. 
54
 Such as Uglow v Uglow [2004] WTLR 1183 at para [9] (Mummery J). 
55
 See B McFarlane, The Law of Proprietary Estoppel (Oxford University Press 2014) at para 2.194 
and B Sloan, ‘Estop me if you think you’ve heard it’ (2009) 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal 518 at pp 
519-520. 
56
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1347 at para [3]. 
57
 Ibid at para [4] citing the County Court judgment, at para [15] (unreported). 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid at para [4] citing the County Court judgment, at para [16] (unreported). 
60
 Ibid at para [6]. 
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provision of economic security (which cannot form the basis of an estoppel claim) 
with those of residential security (which can).
61
 Again without fully confronting these 
issues by delineating what can and cannot form the basis of a representation, these 
questions were also dismissed by Tomlinson LJ. He merely accepted these findings of 
fact, stating that the ‘thrust’ of them was that Miss Blackburn ‘would have an 
entitlement which would be recognised in the event of breakdown of the 
relationship’.62  
 
The treatment of these representations is interesting and, as noted below, lacks 
analytical rigour, particularly as to the court’s analysis of the precise nature of the 
entitlement being conferred. Even though the parties need not identify the precise 
legal interest conferred,
63
 was the entitlement conditional on the relationship enduring 
and was it bound up too closely with pledges of financial security that cannot form an 
estoppel? It appears that these considerations were not pertinent as the cumulative 
effect of the somewhat ambivalent assurances appeared to be enough to dispense with 
the need for specificity as to the representation. Indeed, Tomlinson LJ even stated that 
he did not think it ‘necessary to attempt further juristic analysis of the proprietary 
interest promised’.64 This broad-brush approach to both the nature and specificity of 
the representations may further facilitate the application of proprietary estoppel to the 
often unstructured and undocumented dealings between cohabitants but is unfortunate 
for several reasons. 
 
(B) Consistency with Previous Authority 
 
It must be questioned how far Southwell is consistent with earlier decisions. Of 
course, there is no expectation that the parties will name the type of proprietary or 
non-proprietary interest conferred. However, one dividing line in the case law is that a 
representation as to financial security cannot form the foundation of an estoppel 
claim. This can be explained on the basis that it does not link to an identifiable piece 
of property and, more practically, it has a greater chance of being ambiguous as to 
future entitlement.
65
 Three earlier cases provide insight as to what side of the line the 
decision in Southwell falls.  
 
The early case of Coombes v Smith, decided in 1986, shares some similarities with 
Southwell.
66
 In that case, the parties were married to others but wished to live 
together. The defendant purchased a property and, after becoming pregnant by 
defendant, the plaintiff moved into the property and gave up her job. Although the 
defendant never actually moved into the property, Jonathan Parker QC, sitting as 
deputy High Court judge, accepted that representations had been made to the effect 
that the defendant ‘would always provide her with a roof over her head’.67 Despite the 
case being determined using the Willmott v Barber probanda such that the court was 
                                                        
61
 See Layton v Martin [1986] 2 FLR 227 and Lissimore v Downing [2003] 2 FLR 308, discussed 
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62
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1347 at para [9]. 
63
 See Lord Scott in Cobbe at paras [18]-[21] insisting on a ‘certain interest’ in land.  
64
  [2014] EWCA Civ 1347 at para [7]. 
65
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66
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67
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thus looking for a mistaken belief as to legal rights,
68
 the reasoning of Jonathan Parker 
QC still has significance when considering Southwell for several reasons.  
 
In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, it was found that the fact that the defendant would 
always provide her with a roof over her head was very different from a belief that she 
had a legal right to remain against his wishes. Jonathan Parker QC was persuaded by 
the fact that in spite of the plaintiff asking on two occasions to have the property 
transferred into joint names, the defendant refused on both occasions. Crucially, there 
was no evidence of discussion as to what would happen in the event that the 
relationship broke down and the defendant wanted to live with another. Perhaps 
typical for cohabiting relationships,
69
 the plaintiff said ‘I didn’t ask that sort of 
question in the early days. I thought things would be OK’.70  
 
Here there are several similarities with Southwell, yet interestingly this evidence is 
used in Coombes to defeat the generation of an equity rather than to support a finding 
of a representation.
71
 Thus even though there was an identifiable property in 
Coombes, the fact that there was no discussion of what would happen following 
relationship breakdown appeared to negate the finding of a representation capable of 
sustaining an estoppel.
72
 In the later case of Ottey v Grundy,
73
 Arden LJ accepted that 
a conditional representation could negate a proprietary estoppel claim.
74
 However, 
whilst counsel for Mr Southwell raised this point,
75
 it was not deemed an issue in 
Southwell nor was it addressed in substantive detail. It appears that the fact the 
relationship had ended had no direct bearing on the representation. This finding 
suggests a continuation of the light-touch approach taken to the estoppel 
representation requirements; a trend running through the earlier decisions in Gillet v 
Holt,
76
 Jennings v Rice
77
 and Thorner.  
 
Coombes also supports the view that the assurance of accommodation, namely ‘a 
secure home for life’, also helped defeat the finding of co-ownership under a trust. In 
light of Southwell, this fact again should make practitioners pause when deciding 
whether to argue estoppel and common intention constructive trust in the alternative. 
This strategy is quite common in family property litigation but comes with risks 
where discussions limiting the right conferred to something less than some form of 
shared ownership can undercut the trust argument. Thus where representations fall 
short of a sharing of beneficial title or are clearly unilateral, this obviously would 
                                                        
68
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69
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Smithson, ‘Legal assumptions, cohabitants’ talk and the rocky road to reform’ [2010] 22(3) Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 328. 
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71
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Hayton, ‘Equity and the Quasi-Matrimonial Home’ [1986] Cambridge Law Journal 394 at p 394. 
72
 A similar approach can be viewed in James v Thomas [2007] EWCA Civ 1212. 
73
 [2003] EWCA Civ 1176. 
74
 See B McFarlane, The Law of Proprietary Estoppel (Oxford University Press 2014) at para 2.127. 
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 [2014] EWCA Civ 1347 [6]. 
76
 [2001] Ch 201. 
77
 [2002] EWCA Civ 159. 
 11 
necessitate arguing estoppel as opposed to a constructive trust. However, where these 
representations are equivocal as to what was being conferred, arguing in the 
alternative, with estoppel now as the lead argument, may be advantageous. When 
faced with a choice practitioners have been advised that estoppel:  
 
‘should be preferred for it will always be available where a common intention 
constructive trust is available, there is no need to search for an artificial 
intention and the remedy can be adjusted to fit the circumstances of the 
case’.78 
 
This again perhaps indicates the enhanced future role of estoppel in these cases. Two 
other cases provide guidance on pledges of financial security, which also formed part 
of the representations in Southwell. In Layton v Martin, the plaintiff formed a 
relationship with the defendant, a much older married man.
79
 The defendant wrote to 
plaintiff requesting she live with him and pledged ‘what emotional security I can give, 
plus financial security during my life and financial security after my death’.80 They 
lived together for around seven years and when the relationship broke down, the 
plaintiff was cut out of the will. Following the defendant’s death, the plaintiff made a 
claim for financial provision out of the deceased’s estate and specifically argued 
proprietary estoppel on the basis of detrimental reliance induced by the 
representations in the defendant’s letter. Drawing comparison to the application of the 
common intention constructive trust,
81
 Scott J rejected her proprietary estoppel claim 
as the representations made by the defendant did not relate to a specific asset and 
were expressed broadly as pledges of ‘financial security’. As Scott J noted: 
 
‘A representation that “financial security” would be provided by the deceased 
to the plaintiff, and on which I will assume she acted, is not a representation 
that she is to have some equitable or legal interest in any particular asset or 
assets’.82 
 
A similar approach to Layton can be identified in Lissimore v Downing.
83
 Here, the 
plaintiff lived with the defendant on a large country estate for approximately eight 
years and during that time was assured that she was the ‘Lady of the Manor’.84 The 
defendant also said ‘I bet you never thought all this would be yours in a million 
years’.85 Other representations were made that she would be taken care of and would 
not ‘want for anything’.86 The plaintiff said that she had given up employment to live 
with the defendant, including better job offers, and had looked after the country 
estate. His Honour Judge Norris QC rejected the plaintiff’s proprietary estoppel claim. 
                                                        
78
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Although conceding that cases have permitted a degree of inference when identifying 
the property covered by the estoppel,
87
 the representations made by the defendant did 
not relate to any specific property and were ‘not expressed in terms which enable any 
objective assessment to be made of what is promised’.88 As the representations were 
to unascertained property, satisfaction of the equity would involve the same process 
as identification of the equity.
89
 
 
Distinctions can be drawn between these two cases and Southwell. What appears to be 
the case in Southwell is that the multiple representations went further than those 
provided in these earlier cases. By putting to one side the issue of representations as 
to provisions of income and maintenance as a wife, the Court of Appeal was able to 
focus on representations made by Mr Southwell as to a secure, but more importantly, 
identifiable, home for life. Whilst that finding helped to negate the finding of a 
common intention constructive trust, it appears that this reference to the home was 
enough for the Court of Appeal to find the requisite representation for estoppel. As 
will be explored below in relation to detriment, this also shows that whereas the 
representations were clearly bound up with statements as to Mr Southwell’s financial 
commitment to Miss Blackburn, those statements could be downplayed as merely the 
background context of the case.  This is reminiscent of Lord Neuberger’s remarks in 
Thorner that where an assurance had multiple meanings, an estoppel claim could be 
made out ‘if the facts otherwise satisfy all the requirements of an estoppel’.90 What 
can be viewed here are almost acts of severance whereby the problematic statements 
as to economic support are cut out of the representation. This also resonates with the 
observation made in Macdonald v Frost that the representations need to be analysed 
with regard to the:  
 
‘specific context in which they are given, bearing in mind that members of a 
family are less likely to be precise and legalistic when discussing such matters 
than people in a commercial relationship’.91  
 
In addition, the phrasing of the overarching nature of proprietary estoppel in the 
broadest possible terms by the Court of Appeal may also have enabled the court to 
sidestep the need for a truly clear and unequivocal representation despite the apparent 
insistence on that test. Therefore the criticisms levelled at both Coombes
92
 and 
Lissimore that estoppel principles were expressed in an overly strict manner seem to 
be correct as such strictness is no longer present.
93
 What is clearly visible in Southwell 
is further evidence of a holistic, context-sensitive approach being adopted by the court 
when dealing with representations made in a domestic context.  
 
(B) The Nature of Representations made by Cohabitants 
 
Thinking more broadly as to the implications of this case for future cohabitation 
disputes, Southwell appears to suggest that the courts may be more willing to tolerate 
                                                        
87
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a greater degree of ambiguity as to the precise nature of the representation. This fact 
may open up estoppel more readily to cohabitants for several reasons. Firstly, it offers 
some judicial recognition and accommodation to the unstructured, informality of 
dealings in this context, particularly dealings that may have lasted for several years. 
With Southwell, the assurances took place over a long period of time and although 
they were more explicit than those in Thorner, Tomlinson LJ was clearly exploring 
what Lord Walker had termed a ‘continuing pattern of behaviour’.94 Thus the initial 
representations when the property was purchased were considered in light of much 
later conduct such as Mr Southwell providing for Miss Blackburn in his will. What 
can be seen here is the court refusing to break down the behaviour into discrete 
elements
95
 and to analyse the representation in a narrow manner. Similarly there is 
toleration of a degree of ambiguity. After all, as Mee has noted: 
 
‘lovers are more likely to promise in vague terms that they will love and take 
care of each other forever than to specify the precise benefits which their 
eternal love will confer’.96 
 
There are other examples of the courts going even further than merely interpreting a 
vague representation but instead engaging in a process of inference to piece together 
representations. Thompson v Foy is a good example of this approach where both 
direct evidence of the representation and subsequent reliance on that representation 
was ‘to say the least, thin’.97 Here Lewison J inferred an understanding from other 
evidence such as the dealings between the parties because there was found to be no 
‘specific conversation or…specific words spoken or written’.98 So whilst Mee noted 
that ‘the basic requirement of a representation is likely to prove fatal in the context of 
many family property disputes’, this view may be somewhat out-dated in light of 
Thorner
99
 and now also Southwell.  
 
Secondly, this type of analysis in Southwell provides a stark contrast to the strict 
requirements of the common intention constructive trust. This juxtaposition may 
render the use of estoppel more attractive for cohabitants. It is clear from the 
academic discourse relating to the implied trusts that parties in an interpersonal 
relationship very often fail to talk with specificity as to property ownership.
100
 As 
Jacob LJ stated in the Court of Appeal in Jones v Kernott: 
 
‘In the real world unmarried couples seldom enter into express agreements 
into what should happen to property should the relationship fail and often do 
not settle matters clearly when they do. Life is untidier than that. In reality 
                                                        
94
 [2009] UKHL 18 at para [60]. 
95
 As cautioned by Lord Walker in Thorner at para [60]. 
96
 J Mee, The Property Rights of Cohabitees (Hart 1999) at p 102. 
97
 [2009] EWHC 1076 (Ch) at para [93] (Lewison J). 
98
 Ibid at para [92]. 
99
 J Mee, The Property Rights of Cohabitees (Hart 1999) at p 102. For the position post-Thorner, see J 
Mee, ‘The Limits of Proprietary Estoppel Thorner v Major’ [2009] 21(3) Child and Family Law 
Quarterly 367. 
100
 See J Eekelaar, ‘A Woman’s Place – A Conflict between Law and Social Values’ [1987] 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 93, S Gardner, ‘Rethinking Family Property’ (1993) 109 Law 
Quarterly Review 263, N Glover and P Todd, ‘The Myth of Common Intention’ (1996) 16 Legal 
Studies 325 and U Riniker, ‘The Fiction of Common Intention and Detriment’ [1998] Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer 202. 
 14 
human emotional relationships simply do not operate as if they were 
commercial contracts and it is idle to wish that they did’.101 
 
There are other examples where the courts explicitly acknowledged that agreements 
as to beneficial ownership were notoriously hard to locate.
102
 Nevertheless, in a 
departure from some of the earlier authorities such as Eves v Eves
103
 and Grant v 
Edwards
104
 where agreements were magically concocted by the courts, more recent 
cases all maintain the need for a real or genuine common intention between the 
parties.
105
 Recently, the Court of Appeal in Curran v Collins endorsed this strict 
insistence on a true common intention with Lewison LJ calling Eves and Grant ‘fact-
sensitive’.106  Even though Stack and Jones v Kernott introduced a more context-
sensitive and holistic analysis of common intentions and contained obiter statements 
calling for a relaxation of the acquisition rules for a constructive trust,
107
 greater 
flexibility has not materialised. As noted by Sloan,
108
 the High Court and Court of 
Appeal have been ‘largely unable, but occasionally unwilling’ to soften the 
acquisition rules laid down by the House of Lords in Lloyds Bank v Rosset.
109
 
Obviously stare decisis imposes a limit on how far lower courts can redirect legal 
development but, nevertheless, the fact that the highly criticised Rosset principles 
continue to be rigorously applied poses significant difficulties for a cohabitant arguing 
for a constructive trust.  
 
The more holistic approach to identifying representations seen in Thorner and 
Southwell suggests greater flexibility than the constructive trust and may make 
estoppel more attractive to cohabitants. Indeed, Pawlowski remarked that Southwell 
highlighted ‘the relative ease’ in which a cohabitant could acquire an estoppel equity 
in the family home.
110
 However, as will be argued below, it would be unwise to take 
this argument too far and caution must be exercised when conceptualising estoppel as 
a newly-minted remedy for cohabitants. Where there is a vague representation, it may 
be harder to establish the causal link between that representation and reliance. 
Furthermore, even with the most generous amount of inference and sensitivity to the 
domestic context, a judge recognising an equivocal representation may struggle to 
satisfy themselves as to presence of the detrimental reliance required. It should be 
remembered that representations alone will not generate an equity and a cohabitant 
must also demonstrate detrimental reliance on these representations. The role played 
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by detriment and the limiting effect it may have on claims made by cohabitants will 
now be explored.  
 
(A) Detriment and the Flow of Benefits and Burdens 
 
Detriment plays a key role in estoppel cases through justifying equity’s intervention. 
Whilst the Court of Appeal’s approach to detriment in Southwell is largely consistent 
with earlier authorities, it does offer some insights when applied to a cohabiting 
relationship. It is well known that there must be a causal link between the promise 
relied upon and the acts of the claimant constituting detriment.
111
 In addition to the 
issue of finding a representation, this need for a causal link often presented an 
additional hurdle for litigants in cohabitation cases. Historically, the case law revealed 
the difficulty of establishing detriment and this was clearly visible in Coombes where 
the plaintiff argued that detriment could involve ‘allowing herself to become pregnant 
by the defendant’, leaving her husband and the performance of housework and 
gardening.
112
 Jonathan Parker QC’s treatment of these claims is informative. He said 
it would be ‘wholly unreal, to put it mildly’ to say that the fact of falling pregnant by 
the defendant constituted a detriment induced by the defendant’s representations.113 
He noted that the plaintiff leaving her husband was equally not capable of being 
detriment: 
 
‘The reality is that the plaintiff decided to move into [the property] because 
she preferred to have a relationship with, and a child by, the defendant rather 
than continuing to live with her husband. It seems to me have been as simple 
as that’.114 
 
As for domestic contributions and housework, these were performed as occupier, 
mistress and as mother ‘in the context of a continuing relationship by the 
defendant’.115 Although the assurance does not have to be the only reason for the 
detriment, Coombes provides an early example of the court breaking the crucial 
causal connection. Clearly, it is difficult to explain progression of an interpersonal 
relationship and the deepening of ties between the parties as detriment capable of 
triggering estoppel liability. The same problem be found in the context of the 
common intention constructive trust.
116
 The well-known example is Eves v Eves 
where the female claimant could demonstrate detriment by virtue of wielding a 14lb 
sledge hammer to break up a concrete driveway on the understanding there was an 
agreement between the parties. By stepping outside perceived gender roles,
117
 Miss 
Eves was able to show that her conduct was not attributable solely to ‘mutual love and 
affection’ but to a belief that she was acquiring an interest in the home. However, this 
argument is often difficult to make.
118
 Thus to argue that all your conduct was 
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motivated only by the assurance given looks mercenary but to explain your conduct 
on the basis of affection severs the link between the assurance and detriment and 
would defeat the claim. This tension is noted in Lissimore where His Honour Judge 
Norris QC remarked that ‘looking at a relationship after its dissolution and through 
the lawyer’s lens of a proprietary claim can give a distorted view’.119  
 
Southwell may be informative on the issue of detriment for several reasons. Firstly, 
Southwell emphasises earlier judicial statements that detriment was not a ‘narrow or 
technical concept’.120  Detriment was also part of ‘a broad enquiry as to whether 
repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable in all circumstances’.121 This 
approach built upon the observations made by Floyd LJ in Davies and Davies v 
Davies.
122
 In that case detriment not only covered non-financial contributions,
123
 but 
involved a degree of judicial conjecture in contrasting the benefits of working one job 
against the burdens of working another with ‘more difficult working relationships’.124 
Pawlowski has argued that the fact that courts accepted detriment which comprised 
purely spousal or domestic services gave estoppel a clear advantage over the common 
intention constructive trust.
125
 Here, it can be assumed that the continued recognition 
in Southwell of non-financial contributions constituting detriment is beneficial. Yet, 
without a sufficiently precise representation, these contributions cannot form the basis 
of an enforceable equity, no matter how sweeping the court’s inquiry. This suggests 
that estoppel may not always come to the aid of a cohabitant and should not always be 
preferred over the common intention constructive trust. 
 
Secondly, Tomlinson LJ provided interesting comments on the cancelling out of the 
claimant’s detriment. Earlier cases have shown that satisfaction of the equity may be 
refused by the court where benefits accrued to the claimant outweigh the detriment 
incurred.
126
 This power to refuse a remedy stems from the court’s remedial discretion 
and the fact it should grant the claimant ‘the minimum equity to do justice’.127 The 
power also provides another instance where estoppel may not always be better than 
the constructive trust. With the latter, the finding of detriment reliance generates an 
institutional or substantive constructive trust, which cannot then be denied by the 
court on the basis that the claimant also received a benefit. Once the elements of 
acquisition are satisfied, it is left to the courts to quantify beneficial ownership on the 
basis of common intention. This is not the position with estoppel seeing as there is a 
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two-stage analysis focused on generation of the equity followed by satisfaction of that 
equity by the court.
128
   
 
This issue was addressed in Southwell. It was argued by Mr Southwell’s counsel that 
Miss Blackburn received rent-free accommodation and was able to enhance her 
earning potential through a degree course.
129
 Similarly, Miss Blackburn no longer had 
to pay rent on her previous property and was able to live rent free in the new property 
with Mr Southwell.
130
 When viewed from the opposite perspective, Tomlinson LJ 
recognised that Mr Southwell had increased earning capacity through a promotion and 
was able to benefit from the increase in the value of property through Miss 
Blackburn’s work in the home.131 HHJ Pearce Higgins QC summed this up as Mr 
Southwell having ‘in effect a wife, but without full legal responsibilities’.132  
 
Adopting the broad-brush approach to the evaluation of detriment, Tomlinson LJ 
stated that the judge was ‘wise not to be drawn into an exercise of attempted 
evaluation of the benefits which, as he rightly observed, flowed both ways’. 133 
Obviously, there was a difficulty in calculating the cost of particular activities as they 
comprised non-financial contributions. Tomlinson LJ accepted that there will be 
conduct that is ‘simply incapable of financial quantification’.134 This is a prominent 
argument seen in the constructive trust context to deny acquisition of a beneficial 
interest based on a non-financial contribution. More importantly, the reluctance to 
engage with the range of detrimental acts alleged by Miss Blackburn may be 
explained on a different basis. Tomlinson LJ was keen to stress that some aspects 
were merely ‘incidents of the relationship’ as opposed to ‘direct consequences of 
reliance upon the promise as to security’.135 
 
At face value, this treatment of the flow of benefit and detriments exposes a degree of 
judicial pragmatism and clearly evinces a wide remedial discretion. However, could 
there be a contradiction here regarding when the relationship will be viewed as 
relevant and when it provides merely context? On the one hand, detriment has to be 
‘assessed and evaluated over the course of the relationship’136 and, in light of the 
doctrine’s focus on unconscionability, its elements should not be compartmentalised. 
Thus the ‘familial and personal’ dimension of the dispute emphasised in Thorner or 
the incidents of the relationship offer an important context when understanding the 
nature of the representation between the parties.
137
 On the other hand, the court’s 
treatment of detriment seems also to work in the opposite direction. Non-financial and 
domestic activities that need to be recognised if the court was looking at the 
circumstances in the round have a real risk of being marginalised as merely an 
ancillary aspect of the case.
138
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This unpredictability may present problems for practitioners when arguing estoppel 
cases. If extensive evidence as to the domestic activities undertaken is adduced, there 
is a risk that the court will view those activities as background context to the dispute 
rather than evidence of detriment. Alternatively, they could be explained as, in Mee’s 
terminology, ‘life-style’ choices.139 If less but more targeted evidence is provided as 
to detriment, claimants may fail to show sufficient detriment for the purposes of 
triggering unconscionability. This would also affect the extent of any remedy that the 
court is prepared to award when satisfying the equity. In essence, the approach taken 
in Southwell seems to be encouraging litigants to simplify claims so that the link 
between the detriment and representation is clear.
140
 So whilst the flexibility of the 
doctrine is beyond doubt, it also has practical limitations when it comes to 
predictability of the result and the receptiveness of the court to accept an act of 
detriment within a cohabiting relationship. 
 
An alternative interpretation of this particular aspect in Southwell could be proffered. 
Rather than the court switching between recognition and then marginalisation of the 
parties’ relationship through their treatment of detriment, it could be argued that the 
court is simply taking, as Pawlowski has argued, a ‘less legalistic approach to 
counter-balancing benefits in cohabitee cases’.141 As Southwell concerned a lengthy 
period of cohabitation, the parties had both generated economic interdependency. 
Therefore rather than reducing the extent of any remedy to a claimant because of the 
countervailing benefits they received from the relationship, it seemed more expedient 
to write-off that stage in the analysis, seeing as both parties actually benefited. This 
writing-off of the benefit and detriment could therefore explain why several activities 
became incidents of the relationship rather than elements integral to the estoppel 
claim.  
 
Lord Hope recognised this aspect of cohabitation in his opinion in Stack where he 
stated that for cohabitants ‘living together is an exercise in give and take, mutual co-
operation and compromise’.142 Yet it remains to be seen whether this approach to 
detriment will assist cohabitants seeking to rely on estoppel. It could mean that 
cohabitants may find it easier to argue estoppel as whilst there is likely to be a flow of 
benefit and detriment between both parties, the successful claimant would not 
necessarily have to account for any benefit through receiving a lesser remedy or a 
deduction in their monetary award. Equally, the opposite could materialise as the 
more the courts conceptualise the cohabiting relationship as generating pluses and 
minuses on both sides, the greater the potential for detrimental acts to be explained 
merely as incidents of the relationship. 
 
                                                        
139
 J Mee, The Property Rights of Cohabitees (Hart 1999) at p 104. 
140
 A contrast can be made here to the non-exhaustive and extensive list of paragraph 69 factors laid 
down in Stack v Dowden that are used to displace the presumption of beneficial joint tenancy in 
common intention constructive trust cases. Following Stack, cases unsuccessfully argued a long list of 
factors that were ultimately deemed irrelevant for the purposes of divining common intentions. For 
examples of this tendency, see Holman v Howes [2007] EWCA Civ 877 and, more recently, Graham-
York v York [2015] EWCA Civ 72. 
141
 M Pawlowski, ‘Informality and Entitlement in the Family Home: Estoppel or Declaration of Trust? 
Part One’ [2015] Family Law 175 at p 178. 
142
 [2007] UKHL 17 at para [2]. 
 19 
A final point should be made on the remedy conferred in Southwell. The actual award 
in Southwell indicates that the court took a rather narrow interpretation of Miss 
Blackburn’s detriment. None of the conduct undertaken by Miss Blackburn after 
moving in with Mr Southwell was factored into the monetary award of £28,500. The 
award remedied purely her reliance on his representations of a secure home and 
covered the costs she spent on her previous property and setting up costs for the 
property with Mr Southwell. This suggests that it was the acts outside the actual 
period of cohabitation that the court focussed on and again this prompts questions as 
to the judicial treatment of detriment occurring within a subsisting cohabiting 
relationship.  
 
It should also be noted that even with a wide remedial discretion, the court’s award to 
Miss Blackburn was monetary compensation and not the conferral of a right to reside 
in the property for life (as could be assumed by Mr Southwell’s representations).143 
This choice of a lesser remedy of compensation has clear consequences for 
cohabitants. In Southwell, it could be justified on two grounds. Firstly, it was 
appropriate in this case as there were readily quantifiable improvements to both 
properties forming part of Miss Blackburn’s detriment. In Jennings v Rice, Robert 
Walker LJ observed that cases involving improvements often militated towards this 
type of award.
144
 Therefore, it was far easier to measure financial contributions and 
this is likely to be a key consideration for a court when satisfying the equity in 
cohabitation cases. Secondly, granting a right to occupy would have been simply 
impracticable as clearly the parties did not want to continue residing in the same 
property together.
145
 The outcome in Southwell reveals that, although the award of 
monetary contribution distinguishes estoppel from the remedy awarded in 
constructive trust cases, it may not always be practically possible particularly if the 
conduct is non-financial in nature. Likewise, any expectation of claimants that the 
court may be generous in satisfying the equity must be carefully managed.
146
  
 
(A) Conclusions  
 
In 2004, District Judge Cardinal (as he then was) said that ‘the law relating to 
proprietary estoppel is not available to “rescue” the claims of the genuine cohabitant 
in many, if not most, cases’.147 In light of Southwell, that statement may need a 
critical reappraisal. Although it is still too early to gauge whether Southwell will have 
a significant impact on this area, when viewed in isolation, the decision provides a 
worked example of a successful proprietary estoppel claim by a former cohabitant. 
Thus the result in Southwell itself does not suggest that cohabitants will now be 
‘rescued’ by the law, but rather reaffirms that estoppel can, in some instances, operate 
effectively to provide a remedy upon relationship breakdown. The media claims that 
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it was a ‘landmark ruling’,148  which is probably a reaction to the fact that Miss 
Blackburn had made no financial contributions to the acquisition of the family home, 
also need to be viewed with a healthy dose of scepticism.
149
 What Miss Blackburn 
received was a far cry from what she could have received had she been married to Mr 
Southwell.  
 
When Southwell is viewed more broadly and situated within the latest trend of 
estoppel authorities, the decision may have something more to say. It is not merely 
the case of a court applying ‘old equitable principles to a modern relationship’ as 
Sanders and Carro have suggested.
150
 Rather, through expressing those principles in 
the broadest manner possible and by adopting a more holistic analysis of 
representations, these are no longer the ‘old’ Victorian estoppel principles. These 
principles have, in fact, been modified, albeit not to the extent advocated by 
Gardner.
151
 Although the approach undertaken to detriment may continue to present 
problems for cohabitants by the side-lining of instances of reliance as ‘incidents of the 
relationship’, Southwell shows the court applying tailored estoppel principles to a 
quasi-marital relationship.  
 
Ultimately, this trajectory suggests that a former cohabitant may no longer merely 
argue estoppel as a residual or backup claim to a common intention constructive trust, 
but as a viable, distinct alternative. Originally, Gray and Gray
152
 and Piska
153
 
observed that there may have been an early reluctance by the courts to develop 
estoppel seeing as Stack had liberalised the constructive trust. As Gray and Gray 
noted, Stack ushered in the ‘retreat of the estoppel doctrine to the task of neutralising 
unacceptable or intolerable detriment’ which prevented it from partaking ‘in any 
larger mission aimed at achieving a distributive justice’.154 It appears that through 
post-Kernott decisions refusing to innovate the strictures of the acquisition 
requirements of Rosset coupled with general judicial restraint in this area, estoppel 
may gradually develop a set of pre-requisites more sympathetic to the realities of the 
domestic context. Indeed, could the courts take this even further by rejecting 
representations as the basis of estoppel and instead offer an equitable response based 
on expectations generated by the relationship itself? Going even further, could the 
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remedial flexibility of estoppel offer the potential of creating a redistributive 
jurisdiction similar to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973?
155
 
 
Southwell acts as a useful primer for this debate. However, when evaluating the 
application of estoppel to cohabitants today, caution is required. If estoppel were to 
assume a greater role in cohabitation disputes, cohabitants will still face many of the 
evidential issues posed by litigants using the common intention constructive trust. 
Courts may show a willingness to piece together vague conversations, but they can 
only go so far for even the most meritorious of claimants. Unconscionability 
permeates the elements of estoppel but is not a self-standing basis for equitable relief. 
Even without the need to account mathematically for benefits received from the 
relationship, establishing detrimental reliance in the first place will be difficult if acts 
can be viewed as motivated by mutual love and affection. These issues represent 
fundamental obstacles to a cohabitant using proprietary estoppel but, more 
importantly, they reveal that whilst the doctrine is flexible, it is far from the 
‘penicillin of equity’.156   
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